Users' polarization and confirmation bias play a key role in misinformation spreading on online social media. Our aim is to use this information to determine in advance potential targets for hoaxes and fake news. In this article, we introduce a framework for promptly identifying polarizing content on social media and, thus, "predicting" future fake news topics. We validate the performances of the proposed methodology on a massive Italian Facebook dataset, showing that we are able to identify topics that are susceptible to misinformation with 77% accuracy. Moreover, such information may be embedded as a new feature in an additional classifier able to recognize fake news with 91% accuracy. The novelty of our approach consists in taking into account a series of characteristics related to users' behavior on online social media such as Facebook, making a first, important step towards the mitigation of misinformation phenomena by supporting the identification of potential misinformation targets and thus the design of tailored counter-narratives. 10:2 M. Del Vicario et al.
and present the classification task; in Section 4, we describe a real use-case of the framework on Facebook data; in Section 5, we show how information provided by our framework may be exploited for fake news detection and classification; finally, in Section 6, we discuss the limitations of this work and we draw our conclusions in Section 7.
RELATED WORK
A review of previous literature reveals a series of works aiming at detecting misinformation on Twitter, ranging from the identification of suspicious or malicious behavioral patterns by exploiting supervised learning techniques [13, 14] , to automated approaches for spotting and debunking misleading content [15] [16] [17] or fake images during crisis events [18] , to the assessment of the "credibility" of a given set of tweets [19, 20] . A complementary line of research addressed similar issues on other platforms, trying to identify hoax articles on Wikipedia [21] , study users' commenting behavior on YouTube and Yahoo! News [22] , or detect hoaxes, frauds, and deception in online documents [23] . A large body of work targeted controversy in the political domain [24, 25] and studied controversy detection using social media network structure and content [26] .
Users' polarization seems to inevitably dominate online debates and discussions [27] [28] [29] . Users tend to confine their attention on few sources, often determining a sharp community structure among news outlets [6, 30] . Previous work [31] showed that it is difficult to carry out an automatic classification of misinformation considering only structural properties of content propagation cascades. Thus, taking into account users' behavior may prove beneficial to address the problem of misinformation on online social media.
Recent literature reviews [32] [33] [34] [35] highlighted the need of designing and developing real-time solutions to deal with false information and performing early fake news detection. Indeed, researchers already focused on the detection of rumors and rumor sources in networks and social media environments [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] ; however, in this work we introduce a framework for a timely identification of possible, future fake news topics. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt in that direction, although early warning systems have already been explored for different applications, such as the problem of detecting vandals on Wikipedia [43] or the timely identification of adverse drug reactions [44] . The output information produced by our framework-i.e., whether a topic is susceptible to misinformation-may also be used as a new feature in a classifier aiming at recognizing fake news. The novelty of our contribution is two-fold:
(1) To our knowledge, this is the first work introducing a specific framework for the early warning of possible misinformation targets on social media; (2) We introduce new features that account for how news is presented to and perceived by users on the social network.
EARLY WARNING: A FRAMEWORK
In this article, we introduce a framework to promptly determine polarizing content and detect potential breeding ground (early warning) of either hoaxes or fake or unsubstantiated news. The proposed approach is meant for social media platforms such as Facebook and consists in four main phases, as shown in Figure 1 :
1. Data collection: First, we identify two categories of news sources: (1) official and (2) fakei.e., aiming at disseminating unsubstantiated or fake information. Then, for each category, we collect all data available on the platform under analysis. 2. a) Topic extraction: We extract the topics (entities) associated to the textual content in the data (e.g., articles). Entity extraction adds semantic knowledge to content to help understand the subject and context of the text that is being analyzed, allowing to identify items such as persons, places, concepts, and organizations that are present in the input text. As an example, let us consider the following text: "Dijkstra's algorithmic work plays an important role in many areas of computing science." The entities associated to the text will be {Edsger W. Dijkstra, Algorithm, Computer Science}, i.e., a person and two concepts. b) Sentiment analysis: We associate news and users' comments in the dataset to a sentiment score ranging from totally negative to absolutely positive.
Features definition:
We now use the information collected in the previous steps to derive a series of features that take into account how information is presented and perceived on the platform. 4. Classification: Finally, we perform the classification task using different state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithms and compare their results. Once the best algorithms (and the related feature sets) are detected, we are ready to classify entities and, thus, identify potential targets for fake news, i.e., what we define as early warning.
Features
In the following, we define our features for Facebook. A post is content (e.g., text, external link, video, photo(s)) that has been shared on the platform by a user or a page. Let e be an entity-i.e., one of the main items/topics in a post. We say a user is engaged in entity e if she/he left more than 95% of her/his comments on posts containing e. Notice that, since a post may contain several entities, then a user may be engaged with more than one entity at the same time. For example, we say Alice is engaged with "computer science" and "philosophy" if she left more than 95% of her comments to posts that deal with the entities Computer Science and Philosophy. We define the following features:
(1) The presentation distance d p (e), i.e., the absolute difference between the maximum and the minimum value of the sentiment score of all posts containing entity e. 1 (2) The mean response distance d r (e), i.e., the absolute difference between the mean sentiment score on the posts containing the entity and the mean sentiment score on their comments. 2 (3) The controversy of the entity:
where δ p is a specific threshold dependent on the data;
(4) The perception of the entity P (e) as:
where δ r is a specific threshold dependent on the data. (5) The captivation of the entity κ (e):
where u e is the fraction of users engaged in entity e and ρ e is a threshold dependent on the data.
The controversy of an entity is directly related to how the entity is communicated to users. The greater the presentation distance, the greater is the difference between the sentiment of the posts involving such an entity. Following previous works [7, 45] , the idea behind this metric is that a greater distance may be a valid indicator of the controversy of an entity, intended as the difference of opinion with regard to a certain topic. Similarly, the perception of an entity is defined on the basis of the sentiment that posts containing such an entity elicit in the reader. The greater the mean response distance, the greater is the difference between how the topic is presented and how it is instead perceived by users involved in the discussion around it. Finally, the captivation of an entity gives an idea of how much attention the entity receives in terms of users' interaction. Summarizing, we say an entity e: -to be controversial if V (e) = 1, uncontroversial otherwise; -to arouse controversial response if P (e) = 1, and vice versa; -to be captivating if κ (e) = 1, non-captivating otherwise.
Finally, let E be the set of all entities. We say entities to be covered if they appear in both categories of news sources-official and fake. We define such a set as C ∈ E.
To compute the features V (e), P (e), and κ (e), we need to find the thresholds δ p , δ r , and ρ e , which are clearly dependent on the data-and, thus, on the specific platform under analysis. To this aim, we need to define the following pairs:
where E ρ e (respectively, C ρ e ) is the number of all (respectively, covered) entities in E for which u e ≥ ρ e .
In the following, we will see that a deep analysis of such metrics allows to define the proper thresholds for one's own data. In Section 4, we discuss a real use-case of our framework and show how to select thresholds and, thus, define the above listed features for Facebook.
Classification
To identify topics that are potential targets for fake news, we compare the performance of several state-of-the-art classification algorithms, thus select the best ones and extract a set of features capable of ensuring a noteworthy level of accuracy. To this aim, we rely on the Python scikit-Learn package [46] and, on the basis of the most recent literature [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [54] , we consider the following classifiers: Linear Regression (LIN) [55] , Logistic Regression (LOG) [56] , Support Vector Machine (SVM) [57] through support vector classification, K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [58] , Neural Network Models (NN) [59] through the Multi-layer Perceptron L-BFGS algorithm, and Decision Trees (DT) [60] .
To validate the results, we split the data into training (60%) and test sets (40%) and make use of the following metrics:
-Accuracy, that is the fraction of correctly classified examples (both true positives T p and true negatives T n ) among the total number of cases (N) examined:
-Precision, that is the fraction of true positives (T p ) over the number of true positives plus the number of false positives (F p ):
-Recall, that is the fraction of true positives (T p ) over the number of true positives plus the number of false negatives (F n ):
-F 1 -score, that is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall [61] :
-Finally, the False Positive (FP ) Rate (or Inverse Recall), that is the fraction of false positives (F p ) over the number of false positives plus the number of true negatives (T n ):
To evaluate and compare the classifiers, we measure the accuracy of the predicted values through the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC), where the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) is the curve that plots the Recall against the FP Rate at various thresholds settings [62] .
A REAL USE-CASE: FACEBOOK
In this section, we describe a real use-case of the proposed framework on Facebook. Our final aim is to identify the topics that are most likely to become a target for future fake news.
Data Collection
We identify two main categories of Facebook pages associated to:
(1) Italian official newspapers (official);
(2) Italian websites that disseminate either hoaxes or unsubstantiated information or fake news (fake).
To produce our dataset, for set (1) we followed the exhaustive list provided by ADS 3 [63] , while for set (2) , we relied on the lists provided by very active Italian debunking sites [64, 65] . To validate the lists, all the pages were manually checked by looking at their self-description and the type of Polarization and Fake News: Early Warning of Potential Misinformation Targets 10:7 promoted content. For each page, we downloaded all the posts in the period 31.07-12.12 2016, as well as all their likes and comments. The exact breakdown of the dataset is provided in Table 1 . The entire data collection process was performed exclusively by means of the Facebook Graph API [66] , which is publicly available and can be used through one's personal Facebook user account. We used only public available data (users with privacy restrictions are not included in our dataset). Data was downloaded from Facebook pages that are public entities. When allowed by users' privacy specifications, we could have accessed public personal information. However, in our study we used fully anonymized and aggregated data. We abided by the terms, conditions, and privacy policies of Facebook.
Data Insights
Before going into the details of the framework application, it is worth examining how the features presented in section 3.1 may contribute to our aim. In this direction, some valuable insights can be drawn directly from the data. Figure 2 shows the fraction of controversial/captivating entities also found in fake news, i.e., what we define as covered. We may notice that both controversial and captivating entities are much more present in fake news than their counterpart, thus highlighting the potential of such features in identifying topics that are likely to be subject to misinformation.
Looking at sentiment-based features, Figure 3 shows the mean number of likes and comments received by entities for increasing levels of presentation distance. We may observe a positive relationship between the entity's presentation distance and the attention received on Facebook in terms of users' activity. Indeed, entities that are presented in a different way by official and fake news sources-i.e. with higher values of δ p -get, on average, a higher number of likes and comments and, hence, a higher attention.
Moving to users' response, Figure 4 shows a series of violin plots representing the estimated probability density function of the mean response distance. The measure is computed for the two classes of entities-controversial and uncontroversial-and for both covered and uncovered entities. We may notice some significant differences: distributions of controversial entities show a main peak around 0.4, which is broader in the case of covered entities, whereas distributions of uncontroversial entities are centered around smaller values and present two peaks, which are of similar size in the case of covered entities. This evidence suggests that for controversial entities users' response is usually divergent from the post presentation (mean response distance is near to 0.4), while uncontroversial ones show mixed responses that can be either similar to (mean response distance near to 0) or slightly divergent from (mean response distance near to 0.25) how the news is presented. This may also indicate that there is a higher probability of divergent response for covered entities.
Finally, we focus on the temporal patterns associated to the appearance of a certain topic (entity) on fake news. More specifically, we compute the temporal difference, in terms of hours, between the first appearance of an entity on official information and its consequent first appearance on fake news. Considering all entities appearing on official news in our dataset, about 50% is present in fake news as well, and half of these entities appear on fake news only after they do on official information. Figure 5 shows the Probability Density Function (PDF) of the temporal distance for the following categories of entities: all, controversial (i.e., V (e) = 1), arousing controversial response (i.e., P (e) = 1), and captivating (i.e., k (e) = 1). We may notice a main peak at the first three hours, for all categories, followed by a smaller peak between 20 and 22. Also, we may observe that the emergence of an entity on fake news is confined to about 25 hours after its first appearance on official news.
Summarizing, such insights are interesting and in our opinion motivate the choice of the newly introduced features. Indeed, we have observed that controversial and captivating entities are more likely to be found in fake news and that covered entities show a higher probability of divergent response. Also, presentation distance proves to be a good indicator of the attention received by the topic in terms of likes and comments. Finally, the idea of an early warning strategy to counteract possible fake news is all the more justified by the fact that most topics become subject to misinformation within a day from their first appearance on official news.
The Framework in Action
4.3.1 Topic Extraction and Sentiment Analysis. To perform topic extraction and sentiment analysis, we rely on Dandelion API [67] , which is particularly suited for the Italian language and gets good performances on short texts as well [68] . By means of the Dandelion API service, we extract the main entities and the sentiment score associated to each post of our dataset, whether it has a textual description or a link to an external document. Entities represent the main items in the text that, according to the service specifications, could fall into one of six categories: person, works, organizations, places, events, or concepts. Thus, for each post, we get a list of entities and their related confidence level, and a sentiment score ranging from −1.0 (totally negative) to 1.0 (absolutely positive). During the analysis, we only considered entities with a confidence level greater than or equal to 0.6, hereafter referred as sample E 1 . Moreover, we selected all entities with a confidence level greater than or equal to 0.9 and occurring in at least 100 posts. For these entities, hereafter referred as sample E 2 , we selected all the posts where they appeared and run Dandelion API to extract the sentiment score associated to their comments. Details of both samples are shown in Table 2 .
Features.
Following the features presented in Section 3.1, it is straightforward to compute the presentation distance d p (e) and the mean response distance d r (e) for each entity of our samples E 1 and E 2 . As anticipated in Section 3.1, to calculate controversy, perception, and captivation, we first need to find the proper thresholds for our data. To develop an intuition on how to determine such quantities, in the following, we will analyze the behavior of the number of covered entities as a function of the thresholds δ p , δ r , and ρ e . In Figure 6 , we show for both samples E 1 (left) and E 2 (right) the number of covered entities C δ p with presentation distance ≥δ p normalized with respect to the total number of covered entities C. We observe that C δ p /C presents a plateau between two regions of monotonic decrease with respect to δ p . This behavior indicates that entities are clearly separated into two sets and that all the entities with d p (e) ≥ δ p are indeed controversial. Consequently, we may take the inflection point corresponding to the second change in the curve concavity as our threshold δ p (e), since it accounts for the majority of covered entities. To do that, we fit our data to polynomial functions and compute all inflection points. We get the following thresholds for V (e): δ p (e) = 1.1 for sample E 1 , and δ p (e) = 0.98 for sample E 2 . Notice that the height of the plateau corresponds to the size of controversial news (i.e., d p (e) > δ p ): hence, for E 1 and E 2 , we have that, respectively, ∼55% and ∼40% of the covered entities are controversial.
In Figure 6 , we also show the ratio C δ p /E δ p , which measures the correlation between covered entities C and all entities E by varying presentation distances. Notice that the fact that C δ p /E δ p → 1 when δ p grows indicates that all highly controversial entities are also covered entities. Like C δ p /C, also C δ p /E δ p shows a plateau in the same region of δ p 's. We observe that the main difference between the two samples E 1 and E 2 is in the initial value of C δ p /E δ p and the height of the plateaus. For sample E 2 , the total number C δ p =0 of covered entities is ∼60% of the total number of entities E δ p =0 , while for E 1 it is only ∼20%. On the same footing, we have that the different height of the plateaus indicates that while for set E 1 45% of controversial news are also covered (i.e., they belong both to the official and fake categories), for set E2 this ratio becomes ∼80%.
An analogous approach may be used to find the thresholds δ r and ρ e for features perception P (e) and captivation κ (e), respectively. Notice that such features are only applicable to sample E 2 , for which the sentiment score is available for comments, too. . We show in dashed blue C δ p /C, the fraction of covered entities with presentation distance greater than or equal to δ p , and in solid orange C δ p /E δ p , the ratio of covered entities with regard to all entities with presentation distance greater than or equal to δ p , both for sample E1(a) and E2(b). The plateaus in the curves indicate that entities are well separated into a set on uncontroversial (low δ p ) and a set of controversial entities (high δ p ).
In Figure 7 (a), we show the fraction C δ r /C of covered entities with response distance d r greater than or equal to δ r and the ratio C δ r /E δ r among covered entities with d r ≥ δ r and entities with the same d r ≥ δ r . By definition, C δ r /C is a decreasing function of δ r , but this time an evident plateau is not present to help us set a clearcut division between two distinct subsets. Also, unlike Figure 6 , the quantity C δ r /E δ r is monotonically decreasing. Such a behavior indicates that the higher the presentation distance, the lower the probability that such post is covered, i.e., there is a higher probability of having covered entities-and, thus, a higher probability of dealing with fake news-when the users' response is consonant with the presentation given by news sources. The quantity C δ r /E δ r starts from an initial value of ∼0.6 that is followed by a sudden downfall.
In Figure 7 (b), we show the fraction C ρ e /C of covered entities engaging a fraction of users ≥ρ e and the ratio C ρ e /E ρ e among covered entities and entities engaging a fraction of users ≥ρ e . We observe that again C ρ e /C does not show a clearcut plateau. The same lack of a plateau happens for C ρ e /E ρ e , which this time is an increasing quantity. The results of Figure 7 indicate that the higher the share of engaged users, the higher the probability that a post is debated among the two communities: In fact, we can read from the curve (ρ e → 1) that ∼90% of the most viral posts is covered. Notice that, since we observe a monotonic behavior, the inflection point is just a proxy of the separation point among two subsets for entities with high and low values of the analyzed threshold parameter. By fitting our data to polynomial functions and computing all inflection points, we get the thresholds δ r (e) = 0.27 and ρ e = 0.42. 4 Fig. 7 . Panel (a): C δ r /C (dashed blue) and C δ r /E δ r (solid yellow). The monotonic decrease of the ratio among covered entities and entities with response distance ≥δ r indicates that covered entities do not generate much debates or critiques from their audience. Panel (b): C ρ e /C (dashed blue) and C ρ e /E ρ e (solid green). The monotonic increase of the ratio among covered entities and entities with user share ≥ρ e indicates that most viral posts can reach up to ∼90% of the basin of possible users.
To recap, our features will be thus defined:
4.3.3
Classification. Now that we have determined all the necessary thresholds and thus defined our features, we are ready for the last step of our framework, i.e., the classification task. As an example, let us consider the following news: Both news accounts are about influenza vaccine, indeed the entity "Flu Vaccine" 7 is common to both Facebook posts. In our data, this entity is thus said to be covered (i.e., it appears as both official and fake news). Moreover, it is controversial, i.e., C (e) = 1. We will see that this information may prove helpful to timely identify topics that are potential targets for fake news. Starting from the previously mentioned features, our aim hence is to assess if an entity found on a post is likely to be soon found on fake news as well. 5 Original text (in Italian): "Quest'anno l'influenza arriva prima e sarà più cattiva, a letto in 6 milioni." 6 We report the performances for the four-best performing algorithms (LOG, SVM, KNN, NN). The first reported value refers to E 2 , while that for E 1 is in parentheses. Values in bold denote the two best algorithms. W. Avg. denotes the weighted average across the two classes. Table 3 provides a list of all the features employed in our classifiers. Notice that the main difference consists in the fact that sample E 2 also benefits from features involving the sentiment score of users' comments (features 6-11).
As illustrated in Section 3.2, we compare the results of different classifiers: Linear Regression (LIN), Logistic Regression (LOG), Support Vector Machine (SVM) with linear kernel, K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) with K = 5, Neural Network Models (NN) through the Multi-layer Perceptron L-BFGS algorithm, and Decision Trees (DT) with Gini Index. Given the asymmetry of our dataset in favor of official news sources, we re-sample the data at each step to get two balanced groups and avoid bias. Although an undersampling drawback is that potentially useful information is neglected, such a choice is a popular procedure when the number of observations belonging to one class is significantly lower than those belonging to the other class and is supported by the literature [69] [70] [71] .
For the sake of simplicity, in Table 4 , we report the classification results only for the four bestperforming algorithms. We may notice an appreciable high accuracy-especially for the case of data sample E 1 -and observe that all algorithms are able to accurately recognize uncovered topics; however, their ability decreases in the case of covered ones. Moreover, we notice a significantly low FP Rate for the case of covered entities achieved by both LOG and NN, meaning that even though they are more difficult to detect, there is also a smaller probability to falsely label a covered entity as not, which takes on particular importance, given the scope of this work. Indeed, such a result could be eventually implemented to support newsrooms by raising warnings on sensitive topics. By its very nature, such a system would be both (1) time-constrained (there is little time to counteract) and (2) resource-constrained (human resources-e.g., journalists, communicatorsare generally scarce with regard to information load). Thus, it is more important for us to correctly classify covered entities (high precision) than to get all (high recall). However, future work will consider a refinement of the classification models to increase the recall and improve the results.
Once the two best algorithms are detected-i.e., LOG and NN-we use them to classify entities again. Specifically, we take the whole samples-E 1 and E 2 -and we make predictions about the potentiality of each entity to become the object of fake news by using either LOG or NN. We then keep the two predicted values for each entity. Looking at the AUC score, we can determine the features performance for our classifier. We use the forward stepwise features selection where, starting from an empty set of features, we iteratively add the best-performing one among the unselected, when tested together with the best ones selected so far; in other words, we begin by finding the best single feature and gradually add the feature that improves performance most. The process ends when the AUC score remains unchanged. Table 5 reports the best features, for E 1 and E 2 , for both algorithms LOG and NN. The newly introduced measures-i.e., presentation distance, response distance, controversy, perception, and captivation-are denoted in bold. We may observe that the presentation distance is the best-performing feature in all cases, with the exception of the logistic regression on E 2 , where instead we find the response distance to be among the first three.
FAKE NEWS DETECTION
As we have seen, we are now able to issue a warning about topics that require special caution. This could be a crucial element of a broader system aiming at monitoring information flow constantly and in real time. As a further step, we want to exploit the output of our framework-i.e., whether a topic would appear in fake news or not-to build a new feature set for a classification task with the aim of distinguishing fake news from reliable information. To this end, we show a possible application to Facebook data.
Instantiation to Italian News on Facebook
Let us consider two samples, P 1 and P 2 , that are built from E 1 and E 2 (see Section 4.3.1) by taking all the news-i.e., the posts-containing such entities. More specifically, let P be the set of all posts in our dataset. We define: P i = {p ∈ P : ∃e ∈ E p |e ∈ E i } for i ∈ {1, 2}, where E p represents the set of all entities contained in post p. As before, the main difference between the samples is the availability of sentiment scores for comments in the second one.
We apply our framework for the early warning to each sample E 1 and E 2 and consider their respective parameters and best classifiers, obtaining two separate sets of new features. In specifying such features, we account for the total number of predicted covered entities and their rate, getting a total of four features, two for any of the two adopted algorithms. Under this perspective, the particularly low FP Rate of covered entities results is especially suited to our aim. Indeed, we may retain less information, but with a higher level of certainty. As shown in Section 4.3.3, to assess the potentiality of a topic to become the object of fake news, our framework provides two predicted values for each entity, one for each classifier-LOG and NN. We now use these values to build two new features that will be used in a new classifier-along with other features-with the aim of detecting fake news. Specifically, we may define five categories of features:
(1) Structural features, i.e., related to news structure and diffusion;
(2) Semantic features, i.e., related to the textual contents of the news;
(3) User-based features, i.e., related to users' characteristics in terms of engagement and polarization; (4) Sentiment-based features, which refers to the way news is both presented and perceived by users; (5) Predicted features, obtained from our framework.
The complete list of features used for both samples is reported in Table 6 . To assess the relevance and the full predictive extent of each features category, we perform two separate fivestep experiments. In the first one, experiment A, we test the performance of the introduced state-of-the-art binary classifiers by first considering structural features alone and then adding only one of the features' categories at each subsequent step, for both samples P 1 and P 2 . While in experiment B, we consider again only structural features in the first step and then we sequentially add one of the features' categories at each step. Hence, for each algorithm and each experiment, we get ten different trained classifiers-five for P 1 and five for P 2 -where the considered categories for experiment A are: (1) structural (ST), (2) structural and semantic (ST+S), (3) structural and user-based (ST+UB), (4) structural and sentiment-based (ST+SB), and (5) structural and predicted features (ST+P). While for experiment B, they are: (1) structural (ST), (2) structural and semantic (ST+S), (3) structural, semantic, and user-based (ST+S+UB), (4) structural, semantic, user-based, and sentiment-based (ST+S+UB+SB), and (5) structural, semantic, user-based, sentiment-based, and predicted features (ST+S+UB+SB+P). Again, we apply different classifiers: Linear Regression (LIN), Logistic Regression (LOG), Support Vector Machine (SVM) with linear kernel, K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN) with K = 5, Neural Network Models (NN) through the Multi-layer Perceptron L-BFGS algorithm, and Decision Trees (DT) with Gini Index. Given the asymmetry of our dataset in favor of official news sources, we re-sample the data at each step to get two balanced groups. We compare the results by measuring the accuracy of the predicted values through the AUC score. In Figure 8 , we report the AUC values for the two fivestep experiments. We only focus on the results of the four best-performing algorithms, i.e., LIN, LOG, KNN, and DT. Experiment A shows that semantic features are the ones bringing the highest improvement with regard to the baseline on structural features. However, we also observe We count a total of 52 features for sample P 2 and 44 for sample P 1 . a Average length computed with regard to both posts and comments. b Over total number of characters. c Users engaged with any of the entities detected in the post. d Entities for which κ (e ) = 1 (see Section 3.1 for details). e Our framework for the early warning allows to classify an entity as covered or not. Here we consider covered entities predicted through logistic regression (LOG) and neural networks (NN), since they proved to be the best-performing algorithms (see Section 4.3.3 for details).
remarkable improvements for the predicted features, regardless of their small number. When looking at experiment B, we observe a significant increment in the AUC during the last step (ST+S+UB+SB+P) with respect to previous ones, 8 and this is especially evident for logistic regression and decision trees on P 2 . Moreover, from Figure 8 , we can see that logistic regression is the best-performing algorithm and that it achieves especially high results on P 2 . We should also notice the relative predictive power of structural features-as a matter of fact, the introduction of semantic features brings, in all cases, the largest jump in the accuracy. Table 7 reports classification results for the four top-ranked classifiers-LIN, LOG, KNN, and DT-on our two samples P 1 and P 2 , considering all defined features categories. We notice an overall very high level of accuracy, where the best score is 0.91, and it is achieved by logistic regression on P 2 , with respective precision rates in the detection of fake and not fake equal to 0.88 and 0.94. Our classifiers are generally more accurate in the detection of not fake information; however, both false-positive rates for fake and not fake are significantly low (especially in the LOG case), with a slightly smaller probability of falsely labeling a not fake as fake.
To evaluate the features performance, we compute their AUC score and then employ the forward stepwise features selection (see Section 4.3.3). As before, the process stops when the AUC score remains unchanged. Table 8 reports features performance for both samples P 1 and P 2 . We may note that predicted features show good results in both cases; however, structural and semantic We report the performances for the four best-performing algorithms (LIN, LOG, KNN, DT). The first reported values refer to P 2 , as in that case we have more features for the classification and we also get better results, while those for P 1 are in parentheses. W. Avg. denotes the weighted average across the two classes. features are the most represented. We may deduce that the newly introduced sentiment-base and predicted features are extremely relevant for the purpose of fake news identification. Moreover, the potential influential character of the commenters, embodied in the average number of comments to the commenters, is either the first or the second best-performing features, underlying the often neglected primary role of intermediate nodes in the diffusion of fake news.
LIMITATIONS
Despite the goodness of our results, we are aware that our work presents some limitations. First, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that all fake news, hoaxes, and unsubstantiated information come from unofficial news sources. This is not necessarily true, especially when dealing with disinformation and propaganda and not mere misinformation. However, not all news and information published by unofficial news sources is necessarily false. However, all unofficial sources in our dataset have been extensively reported as untrustworthy/unreliable by well-known Italian debunking sites [64, 65] . Second, although we have showed that controversial and captivating entities are more vulnerable to fake news, there is no guarantee that only such topics will be targeted by fake news. Moreover, a thorough evaluation of how efficient the current framework is when applied in a real timeand resource-constrained system is currently lacking, and needs to be addressed in future works.
Finally, a comparison with other datasets and/or social media platforms is desirable and would allow to prove the generality of the proposed framework. Unfortunately, despite the availability of public resources for fake news investigation [32, 72, 73] , such datasets would not be suitable to the task, since they are related to websites (e.g., BuzzFeed or PolitiFact) that do not have the same characteristics of social media. Indeed, the lack of information about users' activity would make it not possible to compute the features as defined in Section 3.1. However, our results on Facebook are promising and may pave the way to the design of new tools for the mitigation of misinformation spreading on the platform. In this direction, future work will be devoted to test and extend the proposed approach to other datasets and social media.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
In this article, we presented a framework for a timely identification of polarizing content that enables to (1) "predict" future fake news topics on social media and (2) build a classifier for fake news detection. We validated the performances of our methodology on a massive dataset of official news and hoaxes on Facebook. Our analysis shows that a deep understanding of users' behavior and polarization is crucial when dealing with the problem of misinformation. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt towards the early detection of possible future topics for fake news, still not without limitations-mainly due to the fact that fake or unsubstantiated information is often diffused even by official newspapers. When dealing with a complex issue such as massive digital misinformation, special caution is required. Our framework is in its early stage and there is certainly room for improvement, especially in the case of an implementation in a real-time "observatory." Future works will be devoted to refine the "prediction" task, to assess the relevance of the early warnings, and to identify what kind of entities are more prone to misinformation. However, our results are promising and bode well for a system enabled for monitoring information flow in real time and issuing a warning about delicate topics. In this direction, our approach could represent a pivotal step towards the mitigation of misinformation phenomena on Facebook.
